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ABSTRACT
This study examines the effect of debt-servicing costs on subsequent
expenditure growth. Quarterly expenditure data on US households from the US Labor
Department’s Consumer Expenditure Survey are utilized in a typical regression
framework, and an emphasis is placed on determining the effect of a positive change in
a household’s debt-servicing costs on expenditure growth. Initial results reaffirm the
literature in showing a negative relationship between leverage and expenditure growth.
However, upon controlling for the change in each household’s debt-servicing costs, the
strong relationship disappears, and instead, a strong negative relationship between
positive changes in a household’s debt-servicing costs and subsequent expenditure
growth is found to be the dominant force at play. Further work shows that the main
results are robust across years of the sample and across groups of varying levels of
liquidity constraint.

viii

Chapter I
Introduction
An important element to understand within the realm of household
microeconomics is the role that personal debt plays in determining economic outcomes.
Proper understanding of debt and its consequences can help shape economic policy,
which in turn can help to promote stronger economic growth with less volatility. Yet, the
complex intricacies of how debt interacts with other economic components are not fully
understood, and so there is an ongoing need for continued research.
Still, progress has been made in recent years to understand the connections
between personal debt and economic outcomes. For example, the view that households
with more leverage at the onset of the 2007-08 financial crisis experienced larger
spending declines during the subsequent recession has a strong empirical foothold.
However, there is not complete agreement as to the mechanism behind it. One possible
explanation is that tight credit conditions have limited households’ access to liquidity,
and as a result, expenditure growth has suffered. Likewise, it could also be the case
that households have taken part in voluntary deleveraging due to precautionary
concerns such as worries about future access to credit. Both of these explanations imply
a causal relationship between high debt and lower future expenditure growth. Yet, it is
still possible the strong negative association reflects an alternate reality. The households
1

with greater leverage might also be the households that experienced a greater change
in their debt balances prior to the crisis. For example, a household that takes out a new
mortgage potentially exhibits both a large change in debt and a large absolute level of
debt. Thus, the negative relationship between high leverage and expenditure growth
might instead reflect a negative relationship between large changes in debt and
subsequent expenditure growth.
The main purpose of this paper is to explicitly investigate the alternate
explanation noted above. The results will first reconfirm the earlier literature that shows
households with a higher degree of leverage experience a lower level of expenditure
growth relative to low leverage households. Then it will be demonstrated that
controlling for each household’s change in debt obligations eliminates the statistical
significance between a household’s high leverage status and future expenditure growth.
Meanwhile, a strong, significant negative relationship between a positive change in a
household’s debt balance and future expenditure growth will be garnered from the data
instead. Finally, robustness checks will reveal that the main results hold across various
years and across groups of households that are more or less likely to be liquidity
constrained.
The analysis of this paper will be performed using quarterly US household-level
data. A series of ordinary least-squares regressions will be employed to compare
expenditure growth rates between households of high and low leverage and between
households of high and low debt growth. This strategy will be very similar to one used
in earlier research that examined Danish households before and after the financial crisis
2

(Andersen, Duus, and Jensen 2016). That study found that the negative relationship
between high leverage and future expenditure growth disappeared upon controlling for
the change in each household’s debt level, and in addition, the results showed a strong
negative association between positive changes in household debt and subsequent future
expenditure growth. The authors also demonstrated that the results held across various
years and across groups more or less likely to be liquidity constrained. Thus, the results
of this paper very closely mirror yet extend the conclusions reached by Andersen, Duus,
and Jensen (2016). Specifically, this paper uses data from a different country examining
a different time period and applies a distinct measure of debt unique from Andersen,
Duus, and Jensen (2016), yet it will be shown that the resulting conclusions are very
similar. This extension of results is the main source of this paper’s value.
The remaining portions of this paper will proceed as follows. Section II will
provide a more in-depth look at past literature and how it ties into this paper’s story.
This will be followed up by Section III which will discuss the data source and
construction of key variables. Section IV will share the models and empirical analysis.
Sections V and VI will be devoted to robustness checks and implications of the results,
and Section VII will finish with some concluding remarks.

3

Chapter II
Literature Review
Significant progress has been made in recent years to understand the real
connections between personal debt and economic outcomes. For example, research has
revealed a strong negative correlation between household leverage prior to the 2007-08
financial crisis and subsequent spending growth during the recession. Using credit card
data, Mian and Sufi (2010, 2011) found that households in US counties with larger
amounts of leverage prior to the recession experienced sharper expenditure declines
during and after. This was then extended upon in their later work (Mian, Rao, and Sufi
2013) where they concluded that households reduced spending by 5-7 cents for every
$1 of housing wealth lost during the financial crisis. Thus, more leveraged households
exhibited sharper spending declines.
The case for this conclusion is further bolstered by the fact that other authors
have made very similar conclusions using a variety of other data sets. Dynan (2012), for
one, utilized the Panel Study of Income Dynamics to demonstrate households that were
more leveraged in 2007 experienced larger declines in spending between 2007 and
2009. Subsequently, Dynan and Edelberg (2013) utilized the Federal Reserve’s Survey
of Consumer Finances to show households with more leverage in 2007 were more likely
to self-report spending cutbacks over the next two years. Also, studies from abroad
4

(Bunn and Rostom 2015; Andersen, Duus, and Jensen 2016) have confirmed this notion
of a negative relationship between leverage and expenditure growth.
Despite this widespread agreement, ambiguity still exists as to the mechanism
causing the correlation. There are two predominant arguments in the literature. One
theory suggests that credit constraints limit credit access to those households with
higher leverage, and therefore, a negative causal relationship develops between
leverage and future spending. The other theory is that households with higher leverage
voluntarily reduce their debt level due to worries about future access to credit and
future ability to smooth expenditure. Most authors, however, admit that the explanation
is multi-faceted. Brown, Haughwout, Lee, and van der Klaauw (2013), for example,
found that both tightened lending conditions and voluntary reductions in debt have
contributed to the drop in overall household leverage since the financial crisis. Both of
these explanations imply a causal relationship between the magnitude of a household’s
debt level and future expenditure growth. Although, this implication could be masking
the true connection between debt and future expenditure growth.
It is quite possible that households with larger debt balances are also the ones
that experience larger absolute changes in their debt balances. Consequently, it might
be the case that a strong relationship between high debt balances and future
expenditure growth just reflects the positive correlation between high debt balances and
large changes in debt. Thus, the true debt-expenditure-growth relationship might be
driven by a household’s change in debt level rather than the magnitude of it. This
alternate view is consistent with the spending normalization hypothesis put forth by
5

Andersen, Duus, and Jensen (2016). Specifically, the authors suggest that some
households temporarily exhibit debt-financed above average spending growth for a time
and then must slow their expenditure growth in order to return to a “normal” level of
spending.

This figure provides a simple illustration of the spending normalization hypothesis; it depicts two households that
are identical as of time period 1. Household A increases its total expenditure through debt-financed spending
between time periods 1 and 2 whereas Household B just experiences smooth, natural expenditure growth due to
factors such as wage increase. Household A subsequently experiences slower expenditure growth relative to
Household B. The spending normalization hypothesis argues that this reflects the negative relationship between
changes in a household’s debt level and subsequent expenditure growth.

A simple illustration of this idea is provided in Figure 1. The chart represents two
households that are identical as of the first time period, and both households experience
the same growth in disposable income throughout. However, Household A increases its
total expenditure by 4 units between time periods 1 and 2, and Household B increases
its total expenditure by just 1.5 units over the same time frame. The difference in
growth can be explained by the fact that Household A borrowed 2.5 units in order to
increase its total expenditure by more than its growth in disposable income.
6

Subsequently, Household A reduces its total expenditure by 1 unit between time
periods 2 and 3 in order to return to a “normal” level of spending after its temporary,
debt-financed boost while Household B increases its own by 1.5 units due to continued
disposable income growth. Therefore, Household A experiences relatively slower
expenditure growth. Someone with data from just time periods 2 and 3 would conclude
that a negative correlation exists between debt balances and expenditure growth. This
is because Household A exhibited both a relatively higher debt balance in time period 2
and relatively smaller expenditure growth between time periods 2 and 3. Although, this
analysis would be missing half of the story. In reality, it is Household A’s relatively large
change in debt between time periods 1 and 2 that causes the household to experience
relatively smaller growth in total expenditure. Thus, the computed negative correlation
between debt balances and expenditure growth is simply reflective of the fact that debt
balances are positively correlated with changes in debt. This is the essence of the
spending normalization hypothesis: it makes the distinction that a household’s change in
debt level is most important for the debt-expenditure-growth relationship.
Importantly, a number of studies have already confirmed a connection between
change in debt and future expenditure. Ekici and Dunn (2010) and Stephens (2008), for
example, both find that spending responds to a change in a household’s debt level. A
$1000 increase in credit card debt in one quarter is associated with a subsequent
decline in quarterly expenditure of about 2% (Ekici and Dunn 2010). Stephens, though,
shows that expenditure responds to changes in debt in the opposite direction as well.
Households experiencing a 10% increase in discretionary income due to exogenous loan
7

repayment were found to increase nondurable expenditure by about 2-3%. Thus, both
studies offer ample evidence that a relationship does in fact exist between a household’s
change in its debt obligations and its future expenditure growth.
Likewise, the results shared by Andersen et al. (2016) expand the current
discussion on changes in household debt. Using detailed asset and imputed spending
data of 500,000 Danish households between 2002 and 2011, Andersen et al. (2016)
were able to study how both the magnitude and change in debt affect expenditure
growth. They were able to confirm the earlier literature by finding a strong negative
correlation between leverage and expenditure growth before and after the financial
crisis. Although, upon controlling for each household’s change in debt, they found that
the negative correlation between each household’s debt level and its subsequent
expenditure growth disappeared. Consequently, this result proposes that the smaller
expenditure growth witnessed among high leverage households in the wake of the
financial crisis was, in fact, driven by those households’ positive change in debt levels
prior to the crisis.
This is a novel conclusion, and it is somewhat surprising this view has not
received more attention till recently since it is consistent with the idea that borrowing a
large amount in one time period pulls future demand forward. More importantly, one
should note that the paper also found that the relationship between a positive change in
debt and expenditure growth also held in other years and across groups that are more
or less likely to be borrowing constrained. This suggests that credit availability during
the financial crisis years was not special in some way such that it was the dominant
8

driver of the drop in personal expenditure for households during that period. Rather, the
results along with the spending normalization hypothesis instead suggest that the
widespread drops in personal expenditure indicate that more households than normal
exhibited above average, debt-financed spending increases prior to the crisis, and by
extension, more households than normal experienced spending normalization
simultaneously once the crisis set in. This implication will be explored further later in the
paper.
To summarize, this paper is motivated by a few main ideas from the literature.
First, evidence exists showing that households with more leverage prior to the financial
crisis experienced sharper spending declines during and after. Many authors have
interpreted this as a causal relationship where a high amount of debt leads to lower
consumption growth due to credit constraints or voluntary deleveraging. However, the
spending normalization hypothesis put forth in the literature counters this by arguing
that the negative relationship between debt balances and expenditure growth simply
reflects the high positive correlation between debt balances and changes in debt.
Meanwhile, empirical studies have shown that changes in household debt affect
expenditure growth. Therefore, the goal of this paper is to provide additional evidence
towards the spending normalization hypothesis by arguing that changes in a
household’s debt obligations have a real impact on household expenditure growth and
are more important than the actual size of a household’s outstanding debt level. As a
result, this analysis will essentially extend the work of Andersen et al. (2016) by using a
new data set with a new measure of debt which will be introduced in the next section.
9

Chapter III
Data
The data for this paper comes from the US Labor Department’s Consumer
Expenditure Survey (CEX) from the years 1997 to 2013. This rotating panel survey
allows for detailed tracking of American household spending and, therefore, offers an
ample way to study factors that might affect expenditure choices. Data is collected
quarterly on a weighted sample of several thousand households that is constructed to
represent the entire US population. Each chosen household is included in the sample for
a period of five quarters. The first survey round collects demographic and general
information about each household, and this is followed up by four rounds of expenditure
data collection. In the context of the current paper, it is also important to note that
income information pertaining to the past 12 months is collected during the second
survey round.
This structure of the CEX survey was used to construct the sample for this paper.
Each household’s five survey rounds of data were consolidated into a single observation
representing that household. So, each observation in this paper’s sample was comprised
of general demographic and income data as well as four quarters of detailed
expenditure data for a specific household. The quarterly expenditure data available for
each household consisted of detailed spending data broken down by the CEX’s universal
10

classification codes (UCCs). This made it possible to calculate both a household’s total
spending and spending within sub-categories for each quarter.
Table 1: Universal Classification Codes Used in Debt Service Ratio Construction
Debt Payment Type
Primary Residence Mortgages
Home Equity Loans Secured by Primary
Residence
Lines of Credit Secured by Primary
Residence

CEX UCCs
220311, 830201
220313, 830203
880110, 880120

Mortgages, Home Equity Loans, Lines of
Credit Secured by Vacation Homes and
other Property

220314, 790940, 830204, 220312, 790920,
830202, 880210, 880220, 880310, 880320

Vehicle Loans

850100, 870103, 870203, 870803

List of universal classification codes identifying specific payments in the CEX survey used to construct this
paper’s debt service ratio measure.

The main variable of interest in this study is each household’s debt service ratio
(DSR). This measure aims to capture the ratio of expenditure on debt servicing to
regular income1. Examining this debt metric is especially interesting compared to a
standard debt balance because it more accurately reflects the burden that outstanding
debt places on a household. For example, if a household has a high debt balance yet
the monthly payment is relatively low then the high debt balance alone might not
provide as much information as a DSR would about how that debt affects the
expenditure choices of the household. Moreover, the DSR is constructed based on
criteria set forth by Johnson and Li (2010) and includes all typical amounts paid towards
principal and interest on automobile and mortgage debt. This includes payments toward

1

After-tax income was utilized here and throughout this paper.
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both primary and secondary mortgage debt as well as home equity debt. Table 1 lists
the CEX universal classification codes used in the construction of the DSR.
Unlike Johnson and Li (2010), however, the DSR constructed in this paper does
not include payments on consumer credit debt. This is because consumer credit
information is only collected from households during their second and fifth interviews.
Therefore, it is impossible to calculate a change in these debt levels and still relate it to
a household’s future expenditure. This difference in the construction of the DSR should
not be seen as improper, though, since Johnson and Li (2010) assumed payments on
consumer credit to be 2.5% of the total balance which equates to a small percentage of
total monthly debt service payments for most households. Also, one should realize that
Johnson and Li (2010) focused on typical debt payments rather than required payments
since earlier research (Bucks and Pence 2008) has shown households remember their
loan payments more accurately than their loan terms when completing surveys.
Figure 2 illustrates the distribution of DSRs in this paper’s sample. Notably, the
tall bar on the far left of the histogram reflects the large number of households that do
not have any debt payments and, therefore, have a zero debt service ratio. Otherwise,
the distribution of DSRs seems to be very smooth and skewed right with the most
common DSR coming in at about 0.15. These characteristics make sense since it is
reasonable to believe that most households pay around 15% of their typical income to
servicing debt, and few households pay a majority of their income towards debt
servicing.

12

Furthermore, parts of the analysis compared the effects of a high DSR on
household expenditure growth. Thus, it was necessary to define what constitutes a high
DSR. To accomplish this, households with a nonzero DSR were sorted into quintiles and
those with a zero DSR were placed into their own zeroth bin. Then, observations within
the third, fourth, and fifth quintile bins were defined as high DSR households. Next, the
change in each household’s DSR was computed by subtracting the initial DSR in one
quarter from the final DSR in a later quarter as shown in equation 1 below:
(1)

∆𝐷𝑆𝑅1−2,ℎ = 𝐷𝑆𝑅2,ℎ − 𝐷𝑆𝑅1,ℎ

The notation in the equation indicates that the change in household h’s DSR between
time periods 1 and 2 is calculated by subtracting the household’s first period DSR from
its second period DSR.

0

5

Density

10

15

Figure 2: Density Histogram of Debt Service Ratio Observations
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1

This figure provides an illustration of the distribution of debt service ratios across the sample of this paper.
The large density of observations on the left represents the large number of households with no debt
payments and, therefore, a zero debt service ratio. A few outliers to the right are not included in this chart
to avoid zooming too far out from the distribution’s main features.
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What is more, a number of control variables were constructed based on general
household information in the dataset—some of which applies to the head of household
exclusively. These controls included age, age-squared, high school and college
graduation status, race, gender, marriage status, family size, state of residence, town
population size, housing status, and number of automobiles2.
A majority of these control variables with the exception of state of residence,
town population size, and number of automobiles were constructed following the
example set by Johnson and Li (2010) in order to control for any effect general
household characteristics might play in determining expenditure growth. Indicators for
state of residence and town population size were defined in order to control for any
differences in expenditure growth across different regions of the US. Likewise,
information regarding the number of automobiles a household owns was included to
compliment the housing status control. Johnson and Li (2010) originally included an
indicator for home ownership as an imperfect way to control for household net worth.
Thus, controlling for the number of automobiles a household owns is done with the
same purpose in mind. In addition, households were sorted into income and
expenditure-to-income deciles to control for non-linear income and initial expenditureto-income effects.
Measures of liquidity relative to income for each household were constructed
based on checking and savings account balances reported in the fifth survey. Since

2

A table of some key summary statistics can be found in the Appendix.
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these balances are only collected in the fifth survey, it is assumed each household holds
a similar balance in earlier quarters in order to control for liquidity. This assumption is
supported by the fact that about 77% of households reported that their checking
account balance was about the same as a year ago, and about 65% of households
reported their savings account balance was about the same as a year ago. Also, the
results of this study change a negligible amount when each of the specifications is rerun
only including households that report both their checking and savings account balances
are about the same as the year prior. Furthermore, observations were then categorized
into high and low liquidity households where a low liquidity household was defined as
one with a liquid-asset-to-income ratio of less than 2.5%. This is consistent with the low
liquid asset indicator presented by Johnson and Li (2010). Finally, controls for time
fixed-effects were also constructed based on the month each survey interview was
completed, and all monetary figures were deflated to real 2000 dollars.
At this point it is also important to note the lack of a net-worth variable in this
study. A lack of data prevents construction of this sort of variable. However, there are
two reasons why this likely does not matter. First, the coefficients of interest in the
results of Andersen et al. (2016)—which this paper’s results closely follow—changed
very little before and after controlling for net-worth. This suggests that the results
shared below should be robust across groups of more or less net-worth. Even so,
controlling for each household’s housing status and number of automobiles owned—as
was mentioned previously—should offer a partial solution to the problem. Status of
home ownership with no mortgage, for example, rather than status of home ownership
15

with a mortgage or renting should be positively correlated with net-worth, and in a
similar fashion, the number of automobiles owned should at least be partially correlated
with net-worth.
Observations in the sample were necessarily filtered. Households with
nonsensical DSR or expenditure data were dropped from the sample, and likewise,
households reporting zero or negative income were dropped as well3. Finally,
households with heads aged less than 21 or greater than 65 were dropped to eliminate
students and retirees from the sample (Johnson and Li 2010). This process identified a
sample consisting of about 45,000 households.

Observations with a change in their DSR or expenditure level less than the 1st percentile or greater than the
99th percentile, respectively, were dropped. This resulted in 1238 dropped observations. This was done since
several observations had changes in their DSR which implied their debt service payments increased or decreased
by an amount equal to many times larger than their quarterly income. Likewise, observations were eliminated
due to computed changes in expenditure level that were many factors larger than the household’s respective
income. Both of these problems can likely be attributed to partially inaccurate income data since households
were asked to report their income from the prior 12 months rather than their current income. This should not be
a huge concern for the vast majority of observations, though, since most households have steady income from
year to year.
3
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Chapter IV
Models and Empirical Analysis
The crux of this study is to examine the effects of debt and changes in debt on
expenditure growth. Naturally, therefore, the dependent variable in each of the
following models is the change in expenditure for each household from one quarter to
the next. The change in expenditure is measured relative to income following the
example set by Andersen et al. (2016) to ensure households of different levels of
income can be compared. It is important to keep this in mind later when interpreting
results.
The first goal of this analysis was to replicate results from the literature that
have demonstrated a negative relationship between household leverage and subsequent
expenditure growth. To do this, a simple equation of the following form was
constructed:
∆𝐸3−4,ℎ = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑇 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑋ℎ + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐷𝑆𝑅3,ℎ + 𝜖

(2)

In this equation, ∆𝐸3−4,ℎ is computed by subtracting total expenditure of household h in
survey three from total expenditure in survey four and then dividing by quarterly
income. Thus, the variable represents a change in expenditure relative to income from
survey three to survey four for household h. Similarly, 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐷𝑆𝑅3,ℎ is an indicator for
whether household h has a DSR in the third, fourth, or fifth quintiles of all DSR
17

Table 2: Effect of a Household’s Debt Service Ratio on Expenditure
Growth
(1)
(2)
-0.0376***
-0.0101
High Debt Service Ratio
(0.0101)
(0.0100)
-0.1558***
Positive Change in Debt Service Ratio
(0.0116)
0.0028
0.0022
Age
(0.0032)
(0.0032)
-0.00002
-0.00002
Age Squared
(0.00004)
(0.00004)
-0.0208
-0.0204
High School Graduate
(0.0171)
(0.0171)
-0.0144
-0.0162*
College Graduate
(0.0093)
(0.0092)
0.0127
0.0123
Female
(0.0085)
(0.0084)
0.0109
0.0103
Married
(0.0113)
(0.0113)
0.0050
0.0055
Family Size
(0.0034)
(0.0034)
-0.0210**
-0.0204**
Low Liquidity
(0.0101)
(0.0089)
Other Categorical Controls Included
Yes
Yes
Monthly Time Controls Included
Yes
Yes
Observations
45,123
45,123
Adjusted R-squared
0.0168
0.0220
The dependent variable in both Columns 1 and 2 is household expenditure change from survey 3 to survey
4 relative to income. Other categorical controls include race, state of residence, town population size,
housing status, number of automobiles, income decile, and initial expenditure-to-income decile. Results for
these variables are suppressed due to the unreasonable amount of space that would be required to show
them all. In addition, monthly dummies were included to control for time fixed effects. *Significance at the
10% level, **Significance at the 5% level, ***Significance at the 1% level.
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observations as of the third survey4, 𝑋ℎ is a vector of household controls, and 𝑇 is a
vector of time period controls. Column 1 of Table 2 shares the corresponding regression
results.
Consistent with earlier literature, the coefficient estimate on the high DSR
indicator in column 1 is significant, and it implies that households with a DSR in the
third, fourth, or fifth quintiles in the third survey period experienced smaller expenditure
growth relative to households with a zero or first or second quintile DSR. Essentially, the
coefficient represents a difference in difference estimate comparing changes in
expenditure between high and low DSR households.
Also, since ∆𝐸3−4,ℎ was constructed by dividing change in expenditure between
surveys three and four by quarterly income, the coefficient estimate can be interpreted
as a difference in income percentage points. Thus, the coefficient estimate of -0.0376
indicates that high DSR households increased expenditure by 3.76 fewer income
percentage points than low DSR households. That is to say, if hypothetical households A
and B are identical in every way except household A is a high DSR household and
household B is not, then household A might increase its expenditure by an amount
equal to 10% of its typical quarterly income whereas household B would only be
expected to increase its expenditure by an amount equal to 6.24% of its quarterly
income. The 10% figure was arbitrarily chosen for illustration purposes, but the bottom
line is that the coefficient estimate implies that expenditure growth for households with

Criteria laid out in the data section of this paper defined a household as having a high DSR if its DSR was in the
third, fourth, or fifth DSR quintile bins.
4
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a DSR in the third, fourth, or fifth quintiles is expected to be smaller by an amount
equal to about 3.76% of their income relative to their expected expenditure growth if
they had a zero or first or second quintile DSR instead.
The results in Column 1 reaffirm findings from prior literature that a negative
correlation exists between leverage and subsequent expenditure growth. This is notable
because it lays the foundation required to fully examine the spending normalization
hypothesis. In fact, the next step towards investigating the hypothesis was to add a
control for changes in a household’s DSR to determine how the estimated coefficient on
the high DSR indicator might change. This is important because the hypothesis suggests
that the negative correlation between leverage and expenditure growth reflects the
positive correlation between positive changes in debt and high levels of leverage.
The equation 2 model was rerun with an additional indicator variable specifying
whether or not each household increased its DSR from the second to third surveys.
Column 2 of Table 2 presents results for this modified analysis. The magnitude of the
high DSR coefficient is now much smaller than it was previously, and the estimate is
insignificant. Meanwhile, the estimated coefficient on the indicator variable for a positive
DSR change is highly significant and negative. Taken together, these observations imply
that households of higher or lower DSRs experienced similar expenditure growth rates,
and instead, households that increased their DSR experienced smaller subsequent
expenditure growth relative to those with consistent or declining DSRs.
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Notably, column 2 is consistent with early results shared by Andersen et al.
(2016) and succeeds in providing initial evidence towards the spending normalization
hypothesis. This is because the -0.1558 coefficient on the positive DSR change indicator
implies that households who experienced an increase in their DSR increased their future
expenditure by 15.58 income percentage points less than households that decreased or
maintained their DSR levels. The spending normalization hypothesis rationalizes this by
arguing that households who increase their expenditure through debt-financed spending
in one time period return to a more “normal” level of spending in a later time period.
Thus, a parallel interpretation of the Table 2 results is that households who increased
their DSR between surveys two and three necessarily experienced smaller expenditure
growth in the subsequent time period in order to return to a “normal” level of spending.
A natural question that arises from the results of Table 2 is whether or not the
coefficient estimate on the positive DSR change indicator varies over time. This is an
important topic to investigate because one might argue that debt has played a larger
role in some years more than others. This is especially true of the years surrounding the
financial crisis. For instance, it might be natural to think that increases in debt might
have mattered less to future expenditure growth in the pre-crisis “bubble” years when
households were increasing their leverage at historic rates. On the other hand, it might
also be natural to believe and the literature has suggested that increases in leverage
may have weighed more heavily on future expenditure growth in the years since the
financial crisis due to increased credit constraints or voluntary deleveraging. Therefore,
the model presented in equation 2 was tweaked slightly in order to explore these
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avenues. The positive DSR change indicator was interacted with yearly dummy variables
to evaluate changes across time. The coefficient estimates and their 95% confidence
intervals for each year are presented in Figure 3.
Figure 3: Positive Change in Debt Service Ratio Indicator
Coefficient Estimate Across Time
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Coefficient estimates of positive DSR change indicator variable across time.

An informal eye test of Figure 1 suggests that the coefficient estimate may have
actually decreased in magnitude sometime in the middle 2000s. To be sure, a formal
test of this phenomenon is presented in Table 3 where equation 2 was reanalyzed with
an additional positive DSR change indicator interacted with a dummy variable specifying
households after 2005 (Column 1) or after 2007 (Column 2).
Both the 2005 and 2007 coefficients in the two models are positive and highly
statistically significant. This is strong evidence pointing to a change in the relationship
across time; it essentially implies that increases in a household’s DSR weighed more
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Table 3: Effect of a Positive Change in a Household’s Debt Service Ratio on
Expenditure Growth—Changes Across Time
(1)
(2)
-0.1998***
-0.1782***
Positive Change in Debt Service Ratio
(0.0159)
(0.0139)
0.0926***
Positive Change in Debt Service Ratio x After 2005
(0.0223)
0.0669***
Positive Change in Debt Service Ratio x After 2007
(0.0241)
Controls Included
Yes
Yes
Observations
45,123
45,123
Adjusted R-squared
0.0225
0.0222
The dependent variable in both Columns 1 and 2 is household expenditure change from survey 3 to survey
4 relative to income. Controls are the same as specified in Table 2. *Significance at the 10% level,
**Significance at the 5% level, ***Significance at the 1% level.

Table 4: Effect of a Positive Change in a Household’s Debt Service Ratio on
Expenditure Growth—Controlling for Size of the Change
(1)
(2)
-0.0078
-0.0078
High Debt Service Ratio
(0.0102)
(0.0102)
Positive Change in Debt Service Ratio x Size of Debt
-0.7783***
-0.7724***
Service Ratio Change
(0.0875)
(0.0946)
Positive Change in Debt Service Ratio x Size of Debt
-0.0190
Service Ratio Change x After 2007
(0.2063)
Controls Included
Yes
Yes
Observations
45,123
45,123
Adjusted R-squared
0.0243
0.0244
The dependent variable in both Columns 1 and 2 is household expenditure change from survey 3 to survey
4 relative to income. Controls are the same as specified in Table 2. *Significance at the 10% level,
**Significance at the 5% level, ***Significance at the 1% level.
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heavily on expenditure growth in the earlier years of this data set. However, this doesn’t
seem likely since it contradicts the logic used earlier. Instead, it is possible this
difference in the coefficients across time reflects the fact that households increased
their DSR at a faster rate in the earlier years of the data set. If this is the case and if
expenditure responses are proportional to the magnitude of a given DSR increase then
controlling for the size of that increase should eliminate the difference in the coefficients
across time.
Controlling for the size of each household’s change in DSR requires an additional
alteration to equation 2. Equation 3 reflects that alteration:
∆𝐸3−4,ℎ = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑇 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑋ℎ + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐷𝑆𝑅3,ℎ

(3)

+𝛽4 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒∆𝐷𝑆𝑅2−3,ℎ ∗ ∆𝐷𝑆𝑅2−3,ℎ + 𝜖
The only difference with this new model is the interaction of ∆𝐷𝑆𝑅2−3,ℎ with the
previously defined 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒∆𝐷𝑆𝑅2−3,ℎ . With this interaction in place, the model now
controls for the actual size of household h’s change in DSR. Column 1 of Table 4
features results from this updated equation.
There are a number of notable takeaways from this new set of results. First and
foremost, the basic concepts established in earlier discussion still hold. The lack of any
significance on the high DSR indicator means that households with high and low DSRs
still have similar expenditure growth after controlling for changes in the household’s
DSR. Also, the coefficient on the interaction term is negative and highly significant. Its
estimated value of -0.7783 implies that households that increase their DSR increase
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their subsequent expenditure by about 7.78 fewer income percentage points than
households with consistent or declining DSRs for each increase in their DSR equal to
10% of their income. Put more simply, households who increase their DSR by a large
amount will lag the non-increasing households in expenditure growth more than
households who increase their DSR by a small amount.
Next, the coefficient was tested for heterogeneity across time. It is possible that
controlling for the size of each DSR change eliminated the estimated coefficient
differences demonstrated earlier in Table 3. Like earlier, the interaction term was
multiplied by a dummy variable specifying if a household was interviewed after 2007.
The coefficient on this term—in column 2 of Table 4—is found to be highly insignificant;
this implies that the interaction term did not change across the sample period. In
addition, this restructured model helps defend the argument used earlier to explain the
varying coefficient estimates across time (Table 3). Once the size of each DSR change
was controlled for (Table 4), the coefficient estimate was robust across the various
years. Therefore, the relationship between DSR changes and expenditure growth did
not change across time. Rather, households were, in general, increasing their DSRs by
larger magnitudes in the earlier years of this survey.
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Chapter V
Robustness Checks
This section devotes itself to checking the robustness of the results shared so
far; this is done in two steps. First, an analysis is performed to check the role that
supply side factors play in this paper’s models. This is important because a rapid rise in
a household’s DSR can affect its subsequent expenditure change due to choices made
by the household or due to supply side factors such as a limit on access to capital. Thus,
this part of the sensitivity analysis will examine coefficient estimates across groups of
households of varying levels of supply-side constraint. Furthermore, the second part of
the robustness section will check to ensure that the results presented up to now are not
sensitive to the period of examination for DSR changes. Each household’s change in
DSR will be recalculated over a two quarter time frame rather than a single quarter time
frame, and the models will be rerun.
Therefore, the first goal of this robustness section will be to explore the
possibility that the estimated coefficient on the interaction between the positive DSR
change indicator and the size of the DSR change variable differs across groups that are
more or less likely to be constrained in their access to liquidity. This is important
because it might be the case that constrained households are the ones driving the
results derived so far. If this is the case, then it would be evidence aligning with prior
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studies arguing that credit constraints have played a strong role in the lack of borrowing
and therefore have been a cause of lackluster expenditure growth. Two of the ways
Andersen et al. (2016) performed this check was by sorting households into both age
and liquid-asset-to-income ratio deciles and then investigating if the target coefficient
varied across the bins of each decile sorting. This is an appropriate way to check the
estimated coefficient across groups of varying levels of constraint because one might
expect younger and less liquid households to be more constrained.
An almost identical exercise is performed in this study to compare coefficient
estimates of the interacted term for different aged and liquid households. The estimates
were constructed by interacting the age and income decile indicators with the
interaction term from equation 3. Thus, a point estimate and 95% confidence interval
for each age and income decile was constructed. These estimates are illustrated in
Figures 3 and 4, respectively. There appears to be little evidence that the target
coefficient varies over the different age and liquidity groupings. The estimated
coefficient is found to be similar for younger and older households, and likewise, it is
about the same for more and less liquid households too. There are very few groups that
are statistically distinct from one another, and so, overall it would seem that the
estimated coefficient is not different across groups traditionally thought to have more or
less access to liquidity.
This study, however, further verifies the claim that the estimated coefficient does
not vary across groups of households that are more or less likely to be constrained
based on evidence presented by Johnson and Li (2010). In that paper, the authors
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Figure 4: Heterogeneity of Coefficient Estimates across Age
Deciles
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Figure 5: Heterogeneity of Coefficient Estimates across
Liquid-Asset-to-Income Deciles
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present evidence that expenditure of households within the CEX who have a DSR in
either the fourth or fifth quintile and have low liquidity is sensitive to past income.
According to the authors, the fact that the expenditures of this chosen group of
households are sensitive to past income is evidence that they are in fact liquidity
constrained because it hints at the fact that a higher level of income would be
associated with a relaxation of the constraints. This presents an excellent alternate
opportunity to study differences in the estimated coefficient between two groups of
varying liquidity constraint.
A constrained indicator variable was constructed based on the criteria shared in
Johnson and Li (2010). Households with a DSR in the fourth or fifth quintile of DSRs and
with less than 2.5% of their monthly income in liquid assets are defined as constrained.
It should be noted that Johnson and Li (2010) do not make the argument that
households excluded from the constrained group are in fact free of constraints. Rather,
there is just a high degree of certainty based on their evidence that the households in
the constrained group are relatively more liquidity constrained. Furthermore, the
constrained indicator variable is interacted with the positive DSR change indicator term
and added to an amended version of equation 3 shown below:
∆𝐸3−4,ℎ = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑇 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑋ℎ

(4)

+𝛽3 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒∆𝐷𝑆𝑅2−3,ℎ ∗ ∆𝐷𝑆𝑅2−3,ℎ ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑ℎ + 𝜖
Results from equation 4 are presented in Table 5. The coefficients for constrained and
unconstrained households are found to be statistically indistinguishable from each other.
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Table 5: Comparing Constrained and Unconstrained Households
Positive Change in Debt Service Ratio x
Size of Debt Service Ratio Change x
“Constrained” Indicator

Constrained = 0
Constrained = 1

Controls Included
Observations
Adjusted R-squared

-0.8006***
(0.1219)
-0.7676***
(0.1208)
Yes
45,123
0.0243

This table compares coefficients between groups of households shown to have varying levels of constraint
placed on them according to Johnson and Li (2010). A household is defined as a constrained household if
it has a DSR in the fourth or fifth quintiles and has a total liquid-asset-to-income ratio of less than 0.025.
The dependent variable is household expenditure change from survey 3 to survey 4 relative to income.
Controls are the same as specified in Table 2.*Significance at the 10% level, **Significance at the 5%
level, ***Significance at the 1% level.

Table 6: Examining Alternative Time Frames
High Debt Service Ratio
Positive Change in Debt Service Ratio x
Size of Debt Service Ratio Change
Controls Included
Observations
Adjusted R-squared

-0.0032
(0.0101)
-0.6034***
(0.1199)
Yes
44,779
0.0253

The dependent variable is household expenditure change from survey 4 to survey 5 relative to income.
Controls are the same as specified in Table 2.*Significance at the 10% level, **Significance at the 5%
level, ***Significance at the 1% level.

This means that constrained households do not experience a more profound
expenditure response than unconstrained households.
Therefore, the robustness checks so far are consistent in that they all suggest
liquidity limitations are not the most likely explanation for the negative correlation
between positive changes in a household’s DSR and its subsequent expenditure growth.
However, it should be made clear that this does not mean factors such as credit
constraints do not matter, but rather, they are less important in the models examined in
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this paper. This gives additional rise to explanations such as the spending normalization
hypothesis.
Moreover, one might also wonder if the results generated in Table 4 are sensitive
to the somewhat arbitrary choice of quarterly DSR changes. To investigate this,
equation 3 is altered slightly:
∆𝐸4−5,ℎ = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑇 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑋ℎ + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐷𝑆𝑅4,ℎ

(5)

+𝛽4 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒∆𝐷𝑆𝑅2−4,ℎ ∗ ∆𝐷𝑆𝑅2−4,ℎ + 𝜖
The 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒∆𝐷𝑆𝑅2−4,ℎ , ∆𝐷𝑆𝑅2−4,ℎ , and 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐷𝑆𝑅4,ℎ variables have all been changed to
consider each household’s DSR as of the fourth survey and how it is has changed since
the second. Likewise, the dependent variable now measures each household’s
expenditure growth between surveys 4 and 5 instead. This slightly changed version of
equation 3 is reanalyzed, and its results are demonstrated in Table 6. The estimated
coefficients are found to be consistent with earlier results. The high DSR indicator
coefficient is found to be statistically insignificant while a large negative relationship is
reconfirmed for the interacted term. Thus, Table 6 increases the confidence held in this
paper’s earlier results, and more broadly, this section has demonstrated that the
estimated negative relationship between positive changes in household DSRs and
expenditure growth is robust across groups of varying levels of liquidity and across an
alternate period of inspection for changes in a household’s DSR.
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Chapter VI
Extension of Results
The analysis of this paper has worked towards demonstrating the role that a rise
in debt servicing obligations has on future expenditure. In doing so, the distinction was
made that an increase in a household’s DSR is more important than the actual
magnitude of the DSR. It was shown that households that increased their DSR from one
quarter to the next subsequently experienced smaller expenditure growth than
households that maintained or decreased their obligations. Then it was shown that
changes in household DSRs produced similar outcomes across the years of this dataset
and for households more or less likely to be liquidity constrained.
These results align very closely to the conclusions of Andersen et al. (2016). This
is a significant observation for a number of reasons. Notably, the prior paper used
annual Danish data to come to their conclusions. The fact that this study was able to
replicate similar results using quarterly American data eliminates the possibility that the
conclusions reached by Andersen and others were a fluke caused by time-period or
country level specific factors.
On the other hand, the results of the current paper used a different measure of
debt than Andersen et al. (2016). This paper used a measure of payment obligations
whereas Andersen and others utilized detailed total debt measures. Awareness of this
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difference is both interesting and important. It is interesting because we are able to see
that similar conclusions can be drawn from either measure of debt. It is important
because total debt only increases when a household engages in new borrowing. This is
dissimilar from a household’s DSR which can instead increase for two reasons. A
household could either participate in new borrowing or the interest rate could increase
on existing debt balances. For example, a household could take out a new mortgage, or
it could have an adjustable-rate mortgage where the interest rate increases. Either way,
the hypothetical mortgage-holding household increased its DSR.
Unfortunately, the households in the CEX do not report enough interest rate
information in order to study which avenue is the most predominant driving force
behind the negative relationship derived in this paper. This potentially presents
opportunity for future study, but in the interim, it is important to consider that these
facts suggest either an increase in debt balances or a jump in interest rates on
adjustable-rate debt can lead to relatively smaller expenditure growth.
Furthermore, tying together the conclusions drawn so far potentially helps to
explain the severity of the 2007-2009 financial crisis and the subsequent, lackluster
recovery. It is easily verified that one of the largest components in the overall decline in
economic activity during that period was the fall in personal consumption expenditures.
In fact, real personal consumption expenditures per capita declined 3.55% year over
year (U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis) in the midst of the crisis. This was the worst
decline since at least 1951, and it took relatively longer than past economic recoveries
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for the year over year measure to sustainably return to its long-term average of 2.1%
growth.
These facts naturally raise two questions: “why did real per capita expenditure
fall so dramatically?” and “why has the subsequent recovery been so slow?” As was
discussed in the introduction and literature discussion, lots of studies have attempted to
address the role that debt plays in answering these questions including suggestions of
credit constraints and voluntary debt reduction weighing on increases in expenditure.
However, very few have taken the perspective of the spending normalization hypothesis
to answer the questions. The remainder of this section will attempt to do just that.
The consistency of this paper’s results using quarterly data along with the results
of Andersen et al. (2016) using annual data suggests that similar results might also be
found over other time periods as well. For instance, increases in household debt or debt
service obligations over several years might lead to smaller expenditure growth for
those same households over a similar period of subsequent years. Aggregate data, in
fact, contends this may be true. Glick and Lansing (2010) compared increases in
household leverage across countries of the world from 1997 to 2007. They found that
countries that experienced larger increases in leverage during that time period also
experienced more profound drops in expenditure during the financial crisis years.
Unfortunately, I am unaware of any household level studies of this type over
such a long time period, and so, we are left scientifically speculating. However, if indeed
the results of this paper hold over much longer time periods then the spending
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Figure 6: Share of Households with High Debt Service Ratio
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Figure 7: Change in Share of Households with High Debt
Service Ratio over 5 Years
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2013

normalization hypothesis could easily apply to the years before and after the financial
crisis. Figures 6 and 7 help illustrate this point. Figure 6 depicts the share of households
within each year with a high DSR. The share measure was about 0.395 in the late 1990s
and early 2000s and increased to about 0.42 by the middle 2000s. Using the Federal
Reserve’s count of households from the 2001 and 2007 rounds of the Survey of
Consumer Finances, this amounts to about a 7.9 million increase in high DSR
households between those years. An imperfect illustration of this increase is depicted in
Figure 7 where it is easy to see that aggregately a large number of households switched
from low to high DSR status in the early-to-late 2000s. One potential explanation of the
severe drop in personal expenditure, therefore, is that a large share of households took
part in debt-financed above average spending or experienced large increases in
adjustable-rate debt payment obligations over a period of several years leading up to
the financial crisis. If the spending normalization hypothesis holds over such long time
periods then the negative correlation between a positive DSR change and subsequent
expenditure growth defended in this paper would lead to the conclusion that a large
number of households necessarily had to underspend during and after the financial
crisis in order to return to “normal” levels of spending.
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Chapter VII
Conclusion
This paper utilized household level data from the US Department of Labor’s
Consumer Expenditure Survey to investigate the connection between a household’s debt
service ratio and quarterly expenditure growth. A strong negative correlation was found
to exist between a household’s DSR and subsequent quarterly expenditure growth. This
confirmed earlier results of the literature. Most notably, however, this paper showed
that conditioning on a household’s change in its DSR nullifies the statistical significance
of the relationship. Instead, a very strong negative relationship between positive
changes in household DSRs and succeeding expenditure growth was found to be the
driver of the former relationship. This newly found outcome implies that households that
increase their DSR from one quarter to the next increase their subsequent quarterly
spending by fewer income percentage points than households with consistent or
declining DSRs.
A number of smaller details were investigated in addition to this broader result.
First, expenditure responses were found to be proportional to the actual size of a
household’s DSR change. This was followed up by work demonstrating that the effect of
DSR changes was stable across time and across groups of households more or less
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likely to be liquidity constrained. Also, the negative relationship held when the
inspection period of DSR changes was changed from one to two quarters.
Altogether, this paper’s results were consistent with earlier work by Andersen et
al. (2016). This is notable because this paper’s approach was unique in a few different
ways. First, this paper used quarterly American data versus annual Danish data. This
eliminated the possibility that the results of Andersen and others were due to some
time-period length or country specific factors. In addition, each household’s debt service
ratio was utilized in the current paper in contrast to a total debt level. This is notable
because it increases the overall level of robustness and confidence in the conclusions
reached in both studies.
Furthermore, there are a few policy implications of this paper’s results. Since the
results demonstrate that increases in debt servicing obligations lead to relatively smaller
expenditure growth rates, this implies that policy makers should pay close attention to
the growth rate of debt as well as the rapid rise in servicing costs due to a rapid
increase in interest rates. Doing so could help reduce overall economic volatility.
Specifically, throttling the rapid growth of debt servicing costs relative to income could
help prevent extreme drops in expenditures. Policy could, therefore, devote itself to
educating the public on the consequences of overextending themselves in a short time
period. Similarly, regulators could work with lenders to temper rapid debt binges, and
bodies such as the Federal Reserve should be more aware of the consequences of
raising benchmark interest rates when there is a large amount of adjustable-rate debt
outstanding.
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In the future, more attention should be given to studying how changes in debt
affect future expenditure growth. More evidence is needed to better understand the
consequences of pulling future demand forward. This is especially true over longer time
frames. Future micro-level studies should examine whether or not spending
normalization is supported in data over periods of several years. In addition, future
researchers could study the cross-product heterogeneity of changes in a household’s
DSR on various different categories of expenditures. It might be the case, for example,
that durable expenditures are affected more than nondurable expenditures since
households are less likely to cut back on necessary spending on items such as food and
housing.
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Appendix

Appendix A
Table of Summary Statistics
Appendix Table 1: Summary Statistics

Age
High School Graduate
College Graduate
Female
Married
Family Size
Number of Automobiles
Low Liquidity Household
Monthly Income (2000 $s)
Change in Expenditure (Survey 3 to Survey 4)
Debt Service Ratio
High Debt Service Ratio
Change in Debt Service Ratio (Survey 2 to
Survey 3)
Positive Change in Debt Service Ratio (Survey
2 to Survey 3)

41

Average
(SD)
44.83
(11.41)
0.88
(0.32)
0.42
(0.49)
0.48
(0.50)
0.60
(0.49)
2.80
(1.52)
1.05
(0.94)
0.40
(0.49)
4466.23
(4006.02)
-0.01
(0.84)
0.23
(0.75)
0.40
(0.49)
0.004
(0.13)
0.21
(0.41)
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